Frank Adams⁽¹⁾,

Plaintiff

v

State Bar of California, a California public corporation; State Bar Court, a division of the state bar; Rizamari Sitton, Jennifer Gee,

Nancy Watson, Victoria Molloy, David Wesley, employees of the state bar; California Supreme Court; Malcolm Lucas, Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, Stanley Mosk, Joyce Kennard, Armand Arabian, Marvin Baxter, Ronald George, justices of California supreme court, each personally and officially,

Defendants

Case 94-8530 ER (AJNX)

Complaint #1875 Version 1.5

Revised 23 Dec 94

Complaint for damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief for egregious violation of civil rights under color of state law.

Demand for Jury Trial.

Brief in support of injunction and to preclude dismissal recommendation by magistrate.

42 USC 1983 et seq

Date: 27 Feb 95

Time: 10 a.m.

Court: 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS AND LIST OF CAUSES OF ACTION:

TABLES OF AUTHORITIES vii

COMPLAINT 1

JURISDICTION 1

1st cause of action - 42 USC 1983 - INVIDIOUS REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 1

2nd cause of action - DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - MULTIPLE COUNTS 2

3rd cause of action - 8th AMENDMENT VIOLATION 3

4th cause of action - INTENTIONAL DEPRIVAL OF UNBIASED STATE FORUM 3

5th cause of action - APPROVAL OF ACTIONS OF FINANCIALLY BIASED COURT
4

6th cause of action - 5TH AMENDMENT SEIZURE OF TRUST ACCOUNT INTEREST
4

7th cause of action - 42 USC 1983 - UNLAWFUL PRIOR RESTRAINT 5

8th cause of action - DUE PROCESS, ACCESS TO FILES 5

9th cause of action - 42 USC 1983 - UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH OF
PRACTICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS 7

10th cause of action - DEFAMATION 8

11th cause of action - DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF SOLE PRACTITIONER'S BAR
9

SOLE PRACTITIONER'S MANIFESTO 9

NATURAL LAW 9

LITANY OF OFFENSES OF THE STATE BAR AND THE LUCAS COURT 10

PRAYER 18

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES 22

SUMMARY OF ADAMS'S TOP 10 AUTHORITIES 22

Procedural Status and Prologue 23

Incidental Issue #0.3 Judge Steven Wilson, the federal district court judge who heard the Hirsh, Server, and Perry cases should have recused himself because of the money he earns from the state bar - a party to those cases. 23

Issue #1 - the main issue: Corollary to Marbury v Madison. There is no state bar court in California; this is a non-court. An unconstitutional act is void ab initio. 24

Argument #1.1: The creation of the state bar pseudo court was an unconstitutional act and therefore void from the beginning - and very similar to the Judiciary Act of 1789 which also portended to give jurisdiction contrary to a constitution 24

Summary: The convoluted route of state bar pseudo court illegitimate empowerment 27

Incidental Historical Note #1.2 First official use of the term "state bar court" 28

Argument #1.3 Research into other state constitutions supports Adams's position 28

Argument #1.4 California case law strongly holds that no one in government is permitted to create a court or grant judicial power to anyone 28

Argument #1.5 California constitution article 6, section 9 defines the state bar as a public corporation and does not vest in it the right to create courts 29

Argument #1.6 The California bar is a public corporation - not a court - and is not authorized to create a court 29

Incidental Issue:Immunity 29

Argument #1.7 Unconstitutional delegation. The Supreme Court has unlawfully delegated its disciplinary authority to the state bar pseudo court by 1) refusing to hear attorney discipline cases and 2)by rubber-stamping state bar pseudo court decisions merely to avoid the appearance of delegation 30

Argument #1.8 Creation and financing of a court is ULTRA VIRES - not authorized by the corporate charter of the state bar 30

Argument #1.9 Judges can only be appointed by the governor or elected; therefore pseudo judges appointed to the pseudo court of the state bar cannot possibly be judges 30

Issue #1.10 Business and Professions Code section 6086.5 authorizing the twenty three member board of the State Bar to create a State Bar Court is patently unconstitutional 30

Section 1.11 Specific dollar amounts of financial interest 31

Issue #2 Bias. Pervasive bias. Bias of this magnitude precludes due process and it precludes federal abstention 33

Argument #2.1 The Absence of state recusal remedy compels federal court intervention.
33

Argument #2.2 The exhaustion of state remedies requirement is inapplicable to any suit under 42 USC 1983 36

Issue #2.3 All state bar court pseudo judges have a fatal financial bias - similar to the financial bias of federal judge Wilson - and would be obliged to recuse themselves if they were judges. 36

Issue #3 State bar pseudo-prosecutors have a financial stake in the outcome because 1) their salary comes from the booty; and 2) they may (or may not) receive bonuses for convictions 41

Issue #4 The Lucas court and the bar bureaucracy unconstitutionally deprive Adams of state appellate rights by 1) eliminating recourse to court of appeal and 2) putting sole appellate review in the court that created the monster 41

Issue #5 The state bar and California Supreme Court have conspired to attempt to unlawfully nullify Adams's voter franchise 42

Issue #6 The state bar court is unconstitutional because it fuses adjudicative and prosecutorial roles and functions within the same tribunal. 44

Issue #7 The bogus state bar pseudo court is unconstitutional because it is a private court.
45

Issue #8 The state bar pseudo court is unconstitutional because it is partisan court. 46

Issue #9 The state bar pseudo court is unconstitutional because it is an attempted unlawful delegation of public and judicial power to private persons. 49

Issue #10 The state bar pseudo court is unconstitutional because it is not financially disinterested. 49

Issue #10.1 The Client Security Fund 53

Issue #10.3 Anti-trust. Unlawful tying conditions in restraint of trade 54

Issue #11 The california supreme court is unconstitutionally constituted to hear state bar cases.
56

Issue #12 The underlying Ethics Rules are Unconstitutional for Lack of Subject Matter jurisdiction and Violation of Separation of Powers, Vagueness, Overbreadth, and lack of Competent Adoption 62

Argument #12.1 Encroachment of police state is assisted by revenue acts that work by fining citizens for harmless infractions that everybody commits - and this is the game that the bar is playing 64

Issue #13 The Notice to Show Cause Is Unconstitutional for Violation of Separation of Powers, Vagueness, and Overbreadth. 66

Issue #14 The state bar deceives its members with doublespeak and promotes its hidden agenda
66

Example #1: State bar pseudo court calls its $5000 fines "dues" 66

Example #2: Bogus Professional Responsibility Exam 67

Issue #15 Adams is a member of a race that is prosecuted disproportionately more frequently; simultaneously the state bar is staffed with 2 other ancestral minorities - namely Chinese and Filipino - who are hired disproportionately more frequently - pursuant to an illegal quota system specified in the bar rules - and prosecuted disproportionately less frequently
67

Premise #15.1 Bar prosecutions are quasi-criminal as a matter of federal law 67

Conclusion #15.2: Adams is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury - or at the very least, a hearing before a panel of volunteer peers - not trial by his nemeses - group 2's with a financial stake in Adams's conviction 67

Premise #15.3 Adams is entitled to judgment by his peers - not some public servants who have never had a paying client - who have never been forced to segregate funds and jump through all the other hoops for the pseudo bar 68

Premise #15.4 Prosecution's demand for 2 year suspension triggers 5th and 6th amendment rights
68

Issue #16 Suspension is an unconstitutional punishment 68

Premise #16.1 Punishment for crimes has traditionally been fines and imprisonment 68

Premise #16.2 Forfeiture of one's livelihood for even a major crime is unconstitutional and specifically prohibited by the Magna Carta 68

Premise #16.3 Excessive punishment is cruel and unusual per se 69

Conclusion #16.4 Suspension of Adams's license is prohibited by the 8th amendment 69

Issue #17 The California State Bar Act is unconstitutional for lack of adequate Court Access
69

INDEX 71

TABLES OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE #1: CASES CITED HEREIN:

Aetna Life Insurance Company v La Voie (1986) 475 US 813, 89 L Ed 2d 823, 106 S Ct 1580. One of the 10 most pertinent cases. A standard for bias in supreme court justices. U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court which had ruled itself unbiased in an insurance case. A justice on the Alabama supreme court in this insurance bad faith case was simultaneously a plaintiff in 2 cases against an insurance company for bad faith. U.S.Supreme Court ruled that status as a plaintiff against an insurance provider constitutes bias sufficient to mandate recusal. 39

Avery v Midland County (1968) 390 US 474 42

Bell v Burson (1971) 402 US 535, 29 L Ed 2d 90, 91 S Ct 1586. The high water mark for due process prior to deprivation of property interest such as license. 3

Bethlehem Steel Corporation v United States Environmental Protection Agency 638 F2d (7th Cir 1980) 44

Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI (1971) 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999, 29 L Ed 2d 619. Constitution itself grants jurisdiction to federal courts regardless of absence of enabling statute. 1

Boddie v. Connecticut 401 U.S. 377 (1970) 42

Carter v Carter v Helfling 298 U.S. 239 (1936) 31

Chicago and N.W. R. Co. v Nye (1922) 260 US 35, 67 L Ed 115 @123, 43 S Ct 55 69

Coast Casualty v Pillsbury 171 C. 319, 153 P.24 29

Craig v Boren (1976) 429 US 190, 50 L Ed 2d, 397, 97 S Ct 451. Third party standing. 5

Damico v California (1967) 389 US 416, 19 L Ed 2d 647, 88 S Ct 526. Exhaustion principle not applicable in 1983 cases. 36

Delaney v Superior Court (Kopetman) 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990) 44

Doremus v. Farrell 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Nebraska) 44

Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates 600 F. Supp. 678, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1985) 58

Eubank v. Richmond 226 U.S. 137,143 31

Ex Parte Hull 312 US 546 (1941) 69

Ex Parte Siebold 100 U.S. 371 (1880) 30

Ex Parte Yarborough 110 U.S. 651 (1884) 30

Ex Parte Young (1908) 209 US 123, 52 L Ed 714 @724, 28 S Ct 441 69

First Jersey Securities v. Bergen 605 F. 2d. 690 (1979) 48

Flangas v State Bar of Nevada 655 F2d 946. 9th circuit overturns district judge Clairborne's injunction against the state bar because there is a state recusal remedy. California has no equivalent state recusal remedy. 33, 34, 42

Fuentes v Shevin 407 US 67, 32 L Ed 2d 556, 92 S Ct 1983 65

Gentile v State Bar of Nevada (1991) 115 L Ed 2d 888, 111 S Ct 2720. 43 page decision. One of Acuna's top 10 cases. U.S. Supreme court declares that Nevada bar discipline rules are void for vagueness. Gentile's offense was holding a press conference after thoroughly researching Nevada's vague rules to determine what he could say at the press conference. Although Gentile restrained himself, the Nevada disciplinary authorities prosecuted him nonetheless. 63

Gibson v Berryhill (1973) 411 US 564, 36 L Ed 2d 488, 93 S Ct 1689. One of Acuna's top 10 cases. Cited by 9th circuit in Flangas. 1, 60, 70

Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d. 287 (1970) 45

Grayned v City of Rockford (1972) 408 US 104@108, 92 S Ct 2294@ 2298, 33 L Ed 2d 222.
63

Guinn v. United States 238 U.S. 347 (1915) 30

Hadley v. Junior College District (1970) 397 US 50 42

Harley v Schuylki County (E.D. Pa. 1979) 476 F Supp 199 42

Hirsh v Justices, docket no. 93-4114 SVW(Bx) 24

Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hospital 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974) 44

Houghton v Shafer (1968) 392 US 639, 20 L Ed 2d 1319, 88 S Ct 2119 Exhaustion requirement is not applicable to 42 USC 1983 actions. 36

Housworth v Glisson (1978) 485 F Supp 29. re:vagueness. Cites Harris 62

In re Miller 987 Nev. 65, 69, 482 P. 2d. 326, 328 (1971)." 51

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. @136, 75 S. Ct. @623 Cited in Withrow. Basic due process.
45, 57, 60, 65

In re: Gault 387 US 31 @34, 18 L Ed 2d 527, 87 S Ct 1428 66

In re: Keller 88 Nev. 63, 493 P. 2d. 1039 (1972) 51

Independence Public Media of Philadelphia. v Penn. Public Television Comm. (E.D. Penn 1992) 808 F. Supp. 416 58

Jacobs v. Board of Dental Examiners 75 P.2d 96, 24 C.A. 2d 359 (1938) 29

Johnson v Avery 393 US 483 69

Katris v. City of Waukegan 498 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill., E.D. 1980) 44

Katz v. Workers Compensation Board 78 Cal. Rptr. 815, 636 P. 2d 1153, 30 C. 3d 353 (1981
)29

Kaufman v Court of Appeal (1982) 31 C3d 933, 939-940, 184 Cal. Rptr. 302, 647 P2d 1081 (1982) 39

Keller v. State Bar of California (1990) 496 US 1, 110 L Ed 2d 1, 110 S Ct 2228. Ideology.
29, 45

King v Smith (1968) 392 US 309 @312 note 4, 20 L Ed 2d 1118, 88 S Ct 2128. Exhaustion is not applicable to 1983 cases. 36

Laisne v. State Board of Optometry 123 P.2d 457, 19 C. 2d. 831 (1942) 29

Lake Mich. Fed. of Teach. v. Lake Mich. Com. Col. 390 F. Supp. 103 (W.A. Michigan, S.D. 1974). Quoted in brief. 60

Lane v. Wilson 307 U.S. 268 (1939) 30

Lebbos v State Bar (1991) 53 C3d 37, 278 Cal. Rptr. 845, 806 P2d 317, at 41, ft.1 39

Lentz v. McMahon 231 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1986) 29

Leverett v. Town of Limon 567 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colorado 1983) 61

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. (1988) 486 US 847, 108 S Ct 2194, 100 L Ed 2d 855 (1988) requires federal judges to remove themselves from cases pertaining to an entity with whom they are associated if that entity benefits financially - as does the state bar which is an entity from which Judge Wilson derives substantial financial benefit. One of top 10 most pertinent cases. xii, 24, 58

Lorber v. Storrow (1937) 70 P2d 513, 22 CA2d 25 29

Luther v. Borden 7 How. 1, 30 (1849). The right to choose a representative is every man's portion of sovereign power. 42

Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L Ed 60. A void act is void ab initio! 25

Marshall v Jerico (1980) 446 US 238, 64 L Ed 2d 182, 100 S Ct 1610. Disqualification of judges. Cited in Ross. 50

McClure v. Harris 503 F. Supp. 409 ( N.D. Cal. 1980) 46

McCracken v. Board of Medical Examiners 74 P. 2d. 289, 24 C.A. 2d 58 (1938) 29

McNeese v Board of Education (1963) 393 US 668 @671, 10 L Ed 2d 62, 83 S Ct 1433. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in suits under 42 USC 1983. 36

Meyer v Niles Township (N.D. Ill. 1979) 477 F Supp 357 61

Mine Workers v Illinois Bar Association (1967) 389 US 217 42

Morrissey v. Brewer 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d. 484 (1972) 45

Mosk v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 159 Cal Rptr 494, 601 P3d 1030, 25 C3d 474 34

Near v Minnesota (1931) 283 US 697, 75 L Ed 1357, 51 S Ct 625. Injunction is appropriate rememdy to prevent prior restraint of protected speech. 5

Norton v. Shelby County (1886) 118 US 425, 30 L Ed 2d 178, 6 S Ct 1121 40

Partington v. Gedan 880 F. 2d. 116 (9th Cir. 1989) 34, 59

Perry Farms Inc. v. Agr. Labor Relations Board 86 Cal. App. 3d 460, 150 Cal. Rptr. 495
29

Perry v. Justices, docket no. 93-6909 SVW (Bx), Central District of the District of California
24

Pickering v. Board of Education 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 811 (1968)
45

Rosenthal v Carr 614 F2d 1219 (9th circuit 1980). Exceptional circumstances can justify exception to the rule of abstention. Cited in Flangas by the 9th circuit. 34

Ross, Matter of, (Nevada 1983) 656 P2d 832, 99 Nev 1. Financially interested Nevada state bar similar to California's is declared unconstitutional. One of top ten most pertinent cases.
49

Server v Justices, docket no. 93-6789 SVW(Bx) 24

Sniadach v Family Finance Corporation (1969) 395 US 337 65

Southern Railway Co. v. Virginia (1933) 290 U.S. 190 31

St. John McNamara Hospital v. Assoc. Hosp. Serv., Inc. 410 F. Supp. 67 (D. South Dakota 1976) 57

Suss v ASPCA 823 F Supp 181 (S.D. NY 1993) 45

Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 US 510, 47 S Ct 437 @444, 71 L Ed 749. One of the 10 most pertinent cases. This oft-cited case holds that a mayor cannot be a judge in a case where the fine pays the expenses of the court - but this precept seems to be ignored in California traffic courts - and in the state bar court. Cited in Withrow. 60

U.S. v Classic (1941) 313 U.S. 299 30

U.S. v Good Real Property (Dec 1993) __US__, __ L ED 2d __ 114 S Ct 492 41, 48, 53

U.S. v Harris 347 US 612 @617, 74 S Ct 808 @812, 98 L Ed 898 62

U.S. v Mosely (1915) 238 US 383 30

Van Sloten v. State Bar 258 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1989), at 240 51

Wall v. American Optometric Association, Inc. 379 Supp. 175 (N.D. Georgia 1974) 47

Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 U.S. 57, 61, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d. 267 (1972)
60

Western Metal Supply Co. v Pillsbury 171 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491 29

Withrow v. Larkin 421 US 35, 95 S Ct 1456, 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975). Quoted in this brief.
60

TABLE #1-A - LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES

18 L Ed 2d In re: Gault, 387 US 31, 34, 18 L Ed 2d 527, 87 S Ct 1428.

20 Pickering v Board of Education 391 US 563, 88 S Ct 1731, 20 L Ed 2d 811 (1968);

25 Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254, 90 S Ct 1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970)

32 L Ed 2d Fuentes v Shevin 407 US 67, 32 L Ed 2d 556, 92 S Ct 1983.

33 L ed 2d Gibson v Berryhill 92 S Ct 2487, 408 US 920, 33 L Ed 2d 331 (1973).

33 L Ed 2d Grayned v City of Rockford 408 US 104, 108-109, 92 S Ct 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L Ed 2d 222

33 Morrissey v Brewer 408 US 471, 92 S Ct 2593, 33 L Ed 2d 484

34 L ed 2d Ward v Village of Monroeville 409 US 57, 61, 93 S Ct 80, 34 L Ed 2d 267 (1972)."

36 L Ed 2d Gibson v Berryhill 411 US 564, 579, 93 S Ct 1689, 1698, 36 L Ed 2d 488 (1973)

43 L Ed 2d Withrow v Larkin 421 US 35, 95 S Ct 1456, 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975), at 46-47 6033,

89 Aetna v La Voie (1986) 475 US 813, 89 L Ed 2d 823, 106 S Ct 1580

100 L Ed 2d Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp., 487 US 847, 108 S Ct 2194, 100 L Ed 2d 855 (1988),

110 Keller v State Bar of California 495 US __110 L Ed 2d 1, 110 S Ct___,(1990),

118 L Ed 2d Gentile v State Bar of Nevada 115 L Ed 2d 888, 111 S Ct 2720 (1991)855 (1988),

TABLE #2: STATUTES AND RULES CITED HEREIN

Business and Professions code section 6000 35

Business and Professions code section 6002 35

Business and Professions code section 6030 35

Business and Professions Code section 6086.5 unconstitutionally portends to give bar association powers reserved to the electorate. 60686.5 is the enabling statute for the state bar court and is patently unconstitutional. The California constitution specifically reserves the power to create additional courts. 30

Business and Professions code section 6079.1. Gives state immunity to state bar court judges. 29, 35

Business and Professions code section 6079.5 35

Business and Professions code section 6086.65 35

California Code of Civil Procedure section 170 et seq. Regarding disqualification of judges
.39

California Rules of Court, Rules 1-100, Californians cannot recuse justices of the supreme court. 34

California rules of court 951-964 35

State bar rules of procedure rule 2.24. Prosecution may be founded upon mere suspicion.
47

State Bar Rule of Procedure, Rule 509. Prosecution may be founded on mere suspicion.
47

United States Code 28:1331 1

United States Code 28:1343 1

United States Code 28:2201 1

United States Code 28:2202 1

United States Code 28:455(b)(5)(iii) Disqualification of judge where judge or his or her spouse, or certain of their relatives, is known to have an interest that could be affected by the proceeding. 23, 24

United States Code 42:1983 Creates federal cause of action for violation of constitutional rights under color of state law. 1-3, 5, 7, 16, 22, 36, 40

United States Code 42:1985 1

United States Code 42:1988 1

TABLE #3: TREATISES CITED HEREIN:

ALR Fed 54:855 Disqualification of judge under 28 USC section 455(b)(5)(iii) where judge or his or her spouse, or certain of their relatives, is known to have an interest that could be affected by the proceeding 23

ALR Fed 55:650 Disqualification of judge under 28 USC 455 b 4 providing for disqualification where judge has financial or other interest in proceeding 24

ALR2d 10:1307 Interest of judge in an official or representative capacity, or relationship of judge to one who is a party in an official or representative capacity, as disqualification. Pertains to Judge Wilson and all state bar pseudo-judges. 24

ALR3d 72:375 Disqualification of judge, justice of the peace, or similar judicial officer for pecuniary interest in fines, forfeitures, or fees payable by litigants 50

L Ed 2d 40:823 Supreme Court's application of vagueness doctrine to noncriminal statutes or ordinances. Cites Gentile. 66

L Ed 2d 89:1066 (1986, 10 pages) Due process clause of fourteenth amendment as requiring disqualification of state or local judge from participation in particular litigation - Supreme Court cases. Annotation of Aetna v La Voie. 24, 50

TABLE #4: CONSTITUTIONS AND ANCIENT SOURCES OF FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY

California constitution, article 3, section 3.5 38

California constitution, article 6, section 1 was amended specifically to deny the power to create courts except by constitutional amendment. 28

California constitution, article 6, section 18 39

California constitution, article 6, section 2. Creates California Supreme Court. 27

California constitution, article 6, section 3. Directs legislature to create districts for the courts of appeal. 27

California constitution, article 6, section 4. Creates superior court in each county. 27

California constitution, article 6, section 5. Gives legislature the power to create municipal and justice courts. 27

California constitution, article 6, section 6. Creates the judicial council 27

Magna Carta (Original is available at Lincoln Cathedral and Salisbury England - see Encyclopedia Brittanica) - Signed in 1215 - at the point of a sword by King John in a field at Runnymede, England guarantees rights to all descendants of the English Empire and is a part of our heritage and common law. It is written in old English and therefore a translation is shown below - edited slightly.It guarantees that:
1) (Clause 20) Amercements (fines) for slight offenses shall be in accordance with the measure of the offense;
2) (20) Amercements for serious offenses shall not be so heavy as to deprive anyone of his means of livelihood.;
3) (20) Amercements are to be assessed by honest men of the neighborhood (as distinguished from judges and legislatures);
4) (Clause 18,19)Trials shall be local and enough people shall be there to take care of business on the day when the trial comes to town;
5) (32) In the case of a felony, the lands of those convicted shall be held by the king for a year and a day only and then shall return;
6) (38) No bailiff on his own bare word without credible witnesses is to send a man to the ordeal;
7) (45) The king will not appoint any judges, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs, except such as know the law of the land and are willing to keep it well;
8) (30) No sheriff or any other royal officer shall take any free man's horses or carts for carriage duty except with the owner's consent;
9) (28) No constable or other royal officer shall take anyone's corn or other chattels without making immediate payment, unless the seller is willing 68

U.S. Constitution, 6th amendment:"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 68

U.S. Constitution, 8th amendment: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." 69

U.S. constitution, 5th amendment: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, no be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation 68

COMPLAINT

JURISDICTION

1 This U.S. district court has jurisdiction in this cases pursuant under 28 USC 1331, 28 USC 1343, 28 USC 2201, 28 USC 2202, 42 USC 1983, 42 USC 1985, 42 USC 1988. This court has jurisdiction stemming directly from the constitution in some cases. Authority: Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI (1971) 403 US 388, 91 S Ct 1999, 29 L Ed 2d 619. This court also has pendent jurisdiction regarding defamation.

DEMAND FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE WILSON

2 Plaintiff demands the recusal of Judge Wilson. Plaintiff believes, having been so informed by Stu Hirsh, that Judge Wilson admitted in open court on the record in Hirsh that Judge Wilson has received income by providing services for defendant bar's compulsory make-work seminars.

ABSTENTION

3 This case in not appropriate for abstention because abstention doctrine presumes the availability of a state court. The defendants here, including the California supreme court have eliminated state appellate review in bar discipline cases by statute or state rule of court. Therefore plaintiff has no available state forum. Before 19__ plaintiffs could have appealed an adverse administrative decision to the court of appeal. Now the only path of appeal is directly to the California supreme court - the very court whose actions are challenged by plaintiff. In Gibson v Berryhill (1973) 411 us 564, 36 L Ed 2d 488, 39 S Ct 1689, the Supreme Court acknowledged that absence of a fair forum is a basis for suppression of the abstention doctrine.

1st cause of action - 42 USC 1983 - INVIDIOUS REVERSE DISCRIMINATION

4 Plaintiff is a white male of Hispanic ancestry. He is a citizen and resident of California, the United States, and this Central California district of the United States District Court.

5 Plaintiff is a law school graduate with 16 years of experience as a licensed attorney. Plaintiff is currently fully licensed and fully entitled to practice law in all California state courts, and in the Central California and Southern California districts of the United States District Court.

6 Plaintiff maintains a law practice in the greater Los Angeles metropolitan area including Ventura, and Santa Barbara counties.

7 All bar employee defendants conspired to deny plaintiff his rights under the 5th 14th amendment (and his inalienable rights) to due process and equal protection of the laws.

8 White male sole practitioners including plaintiff are disciplined disproportionately higher than other gender, race, and occupational groups in the bar.

9 The bar used a quote system for hiring. The staff of the bar is disproportionately non-white, non-male, and non-sole practitioner.

10 Plaintiff is entitled to redress under 42 USC 1983 and other statutes.

2nd cause of action - DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS - MULTIPLE COUNTS

11 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

12 Bar discipline actions are quasi-criminal.

13 Plaintiff contends that all CRIMINAL procedural rights accrue - and the bar has violated many of them.

14 The state bar court provides no parallel to demurrer. A litigant in state bar court has no equivalent to demurrer or the federal equivalent of failure to state a cause of action. This constitutes denial of due process. The process is used to extract inflammatory testimony and invasion of privacy for the purpose of coloring a case against the attorney. Bar rules provide no protection of constitutional rights. California administrative rules forbid the administrative body from ruling in the litigant's favor on new constitutional issues. The state bar court provides no means to challenge procedures that violate constitutional rights. Therefore federal intervention is necessary to order the court to respect our rights. We have a right to due process at all levels of administration of justice. Bell v Burson (1971) 402 US 535, 29 L Ed 2d 90, 91 S Ct 1586. We ask this court to find that the California statute that portends to preclude administrative forums from declaring the unconstitutionality of actions or rules is itself unconstitutional.

15 The vague rules used to enforce discipline deny plaintiff his constitutional rights to due process. In particular, allegations that he violated his oath of office are so vague as to deny adequate notice.

16 Plaintiff is entitled to redress under 42 USC 1983.

3rd cause of action - 8th AMENDMENT VIOLATION

17 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

18 Suspension of Adams for 6 months constituted deprival of his livelihood.

19 This constitutes a violation of the 8th amendment under color of law.

4th cause of action - INTENTIONAL DEPRIVAL OF UNBIASED STATE FORUM

20 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

21 Defendants Malcolm Lucas, Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, Stanley Mosk, Joyce Kennard, Armand Arabian, Marvin Baxter, Ronald George intentionally deprived plaintiff of his right to due process of law by conspiring with all other defendants and by acting (by virtue of authorship and mandating California rules of court which specifically decline jurisdiction to the court of appeal despite legislative grant of jurisdiction albeit optional) deny to plaintiff a unbiased forum in the court of appeal.

5th cause of action - APPROVAL OF ACTIONS OF FINANCIALLY BIASED COURT

22 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

23 Defendants Malcolm Lucas, Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, Stanley Mosk, Joyce Kennard, Armand Arabian, Marvin Baxter, Ronald George intentionally deprived plaintiff of his right to due process of law by conspiring to deny (by virtue of California rules of court which they author) to plaintiff a unbiased forum in the court of appeal.

6th cause of action - 5TH AMENDMENT SEIZURE OF TRUST ACCOUNT INTEREST

24 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

25 In approximately 1986 the bar demanded that banks pay client trust fund interest to the state bar's special fund. This seizure violates the 5th amendment. Plaintiff has jus tertii standing to assert the rights of his clients in this regard under Craig v Boren (1976) 429 US 190, 50 L Ed 2d, 397, 97 S Ct 451 and demands restitution.

7th cause of action - 42 USC 1983 - UNLAWFUL PRIOR RESTRAINT

26 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

27 The practice of law consists of speech in courts and speech outside of courts. Only courts may regulate the speech therein - and the may only do so my barring appearance. Neither the courts nor the bar may not regulate speech with clients. The bar restricted plaintiff's speech my the 6 month suspension in 1992 and threatens to do it again.

28 Injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent prior restraint. Near v Minnesota (1931) 283 US 697, 75 L Ed 1357, 51 S Ct 625.

8th cause of action - DUE PROCESS, ACCESS TO FILES

29 On August 1, 1994 plaintiff missed a hearing in state bar court before Jennifer Gee because he accompanied his 11 year old daughter Lisette to an emergency MRI examination of her brain. Gee defaulted plaintiff despite protests by Adams's attorney who was present. Gee relented and rescheduled the hearing. However, a witness could not appear and Gee vacated the date. Gee unilaterally rescheduled for 23 November - the day before Thanksgiving. Plaintiff was ordered to be in Compton state criminal court that day for a preliminary examination for a client accused of attempted murder. Adams's counsel was unable to attend because his car had been impounded. Despite numerous requests, plaintiff and his counsel have been denied access to Adams's file for the entire pendency of his bar case; the bar keeps the file in San Francisco for the convenience of Gee who offices in San Francisco. Denial of access to this public file constitutes denial of due process.

30 Dirty tricks. In a Friday in October or November 1994 David Wesley, a pseudo judge of the state bar pseudo court was in session nearly the entire day with Douglas Palaschak, counsel for plaintiff Frank Adams. Rather than tell Palaschak in person, Wesley mailed to Palaschak a notice that he had been placed in inactive status immediately at the request of defendant Molloy with no hearing. Palaschak changed his status back to active within 48 hours but in the mean time Jennifer Gee another pseudo judge of the state bar pseudo court took it upon herself to notify Adams and recommend to him that he obtain new counsel.

31 Gee's clerk, Doug Hull, recently released information to plaintiff's opposing counsel in a personal injury case. Upon inquiry by Adams's counsel herein, Palaschak, Hull said that Gee would be making some sort of decision in plaintiff's case "before December 23rd [1994]".

32 Based on the state bar court's previous disbarments on the eve of a federal court filing, plaintiff fears that the bar will disbar him this week although the current range of punishment for plaintiff's alleged offense (late payment on a personal injury settlement) for members who do not challenge the bar would be suspension for 0 days to 2 years.

33 Plaintiff fears a retaliatory disbarment or suspension. He has appealed to the California supreme court but the clerk refused to accept his petition on the basis that his prior motion to dismiss in state bar court was rejected (without any hearing or discussion) more than 60 days prior to plaintiff's petition to the California supreme court on approximately December 1, 1994.

34 Plaintiff suffered disastrous financial consequences from his suspension in 1992. He lost his luxury island home in Avalon. He was forced into bankruptcy. Plaintiff supports a wife and young child at home. He has an office staff that depends on his income. He has clients who depend on him. He has expenses that simply cannot be turned on and off with suspensions. In particular he has a helicopter crash case involving deaths for which he has been ready for trial for some time. Court congestion prevents trial for several months. He has invested much time and money in this case and the plaintiffs in the case would be severely prejudiced.

35 Because the state bar court is relatively new - and many of the issues before this court are of first impression, it is likely that the state bar court procedures will be modified by one court or another to accommodate constitutional mandates.

36 Plaintiff requests and injunction to preserve the status quo pending a hearing on the constitutional issues in this court - or upon remand to a state court - or even the review department of the state bar court. All plaintiff is seeking is orderly litigation and avoidance of irreparable harm. Defendant state bar court lawyers are young and inexperienced and have little concern for the financial realities of a suspension.

37 Plaintiff asks an injunction and a TRO pending appeal - to preclude rash judgment by Gee - who has a record in this case of rash judgments - most notably issuing a default when plaintiff was absent due to his child's medical emergency.

9th cause of action - 42 USC 1983 - UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH OF

PRACTICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS

38 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

39 Traditionally in California, the federal courts have relegated discipline to the state bar. This worked when discipline was administered only for serious matters. The trivialization and bias in current discipline mandates that the federal courts now refrain from this deference. Plaintiff requests declaratory relief in this regard.

10th cause of action - DEFAMATION

40 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

41 This court has pendant jurisdiction for this cause of action.

42 Defendant Sitton included the following sentence in her subpena to plaintiff's bank: "We appreciate your cooperation with our efforts to identify and discipline unethical conduct by certain California attorneys." Sitton deleted the offending statement from subsequent subpoenas.

43 Sitton intended that the statement expose plaintiff to hatred, contempt, ridicule, and obloquy.

44 Plaintiff's professional reputation in the close knit community of Santa Barbara has been damaged as a result of the defamation.

45 Despite an attempt by the legislature to grant immunity to state bar prosecutors, such immunity does not apply to Sitton because 1) she is not a true prosecutor; 2) the statement was unnecessary to the issuance of the subpena; 3) to the extent that the prosecution regarded trust funds, there can be no valid "conviction" for anything by the state bar pseudo court; and 4) the technical violation of the trust fund rules is not unethical.

11th cause of action - DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION OF SOLE PRACTITIONER'S

BAR

46 Plaintiff incorporates by this reference every other paragraph in this complaint in this case of action as though fully set forth herein.

47 Plaintiff requests this court to declare due to the reasons stated herein the state bar may not punish plaintiff as they apparently intend.

SOLE PRACTITIONER'S MANIFESTO

48 When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for group of lawyers to dissolve the political bands that have connected them with the state bar, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which natural law entitles them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them to separate.

NATURAL LAW

49 Inalienable⁽²⁾ rights include life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness⁽³⁾, and the right to honestly earn a living - including the right to responsibly practice law.

50 Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed⁽⁴⁾,

51 Whenever any government becomes a master instead of a servant, it is the right of the people to alter it, restrain it, or to abolish it⁽⁵⁾, in order to survive and achieve safety and happiness⁽⁶⁾. Prudence dictates that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly lawyers (and other humans) are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which we are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such bar organization, and to provide new guards for their future security.

LITANY OF OFFENSES OF THE STATE BAR AND THE LUCAS COURT

52 Such has been the patient sufferance of plaintiff Adams; and such is now the necessity which constrains him to restrain the state bar. The history of the present defendant state bar and its co-conspirators (including Diane Yu and Malcolm Lucas) is a history of repeated injuries, usurpations, demagoguery, and oppression, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over lawyers - and especially white male sole practitioners. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

53 Shortly before 1984 Diane Yu, having no particularly pertinent background, became employed by the state bar. In 1984 she was on the committee of bar examiners which made a mistake in grading approximately 100 exams. She attempted to keep the mistake secret and refused to admit the mistake until compelled by a federal lawsuit - and after most of the aggrieved applicants had taken and passed a 2nd bar exam.

54 In approximately 1986 the bar seized the right forever to future interest on all client trust accounts.

55 Since 1989 the state bar has judged multitudes of cases regarding offenses regarding these trust funds despite their obvious bias stemming from their receiving the interest on the funds.

56 In approximately 1986 the bar drastically increased compulsory bar dues - without consent of the bar members.

57 In 1989 the bar instituted the state bar court (in violation of the California constitution) and staffed it with pseudo-judges appointed by the defendant co-conspirator California supreme court (in violation of the California constitutional requirement that judges be appointed by the governor and elected).

58 In 1989 the California supreme court eliminated by rule the jurisdiction of the court of appeal to hear appeals from state bar court - thereby assuring that all appeal was to itself - the very body who appointed the persons to the state bar court from which appeal would be taken.

59 Defendants state bar court and pseudo judge Jennifer Gee have antagonistically chosen distant⁽⁷⁾ San Francisco as the repository for the files in plaintiff's case - although other case files are in Los Angeles. Plaintiff and his attorney Palaschak have requested access to the files numerous times - and in fact have never seen plaintiff's file.

60 Defendant state bar has an annual budget of approximately $75,000,000.00 - from compelled dues of attorneys and from secret $5,000 "costs" assessed against attorneys in state bar court.

61 Since establishing the state bar court, the Lucas court has refused to hear any appeals from decisions of its child, the state bar court, and has unlawfully shut off appeal to the court of appeal. The legislature improperly delegated to the Lucas court (via B&P 60082) its authority to legislate jurisdictional limitations of the court of appeal in bar cases.

62 The legislature long ago destroyed the lawyer's path of administrative appeal to the local superior court.

63 The bar has instituted a program of make-work entitled Mandatory Continuing Legal Education - and then excused government lawyers from participation thereby discriminating against sole practitioners.

64 Defendant state bar prosecutors routinely violate lawyers's Miranda rights through misleading statements and a myriad of biased abnormal procedural rules for the sole purposes of fatiguing them into compliance with their measures.

65 Defendants have attacked our heroes - namely: Melvin Belli, Marvin Mitchelson, Steven Yagman, Jonathan Wolfgram, Ralph Server, Stu Hirsh, Michael Haley, Slate & Leoni - white male sole practitioners all. Some survived, but many have seen their careers ruined.

66 The bar has refused to assent to true reform - most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

67 Defendant state bar court has suspended attorney operations and taken their livelihood unilaterally without any hearing for trifles without any showing of irreparable harm; and when so suspended, the bar has utterly neglected their plight.

68 The bar has so diluted the right of representation that the board of governors is now just a figurehead consisting of transient members.

69 Defendant state bar has made its pseudo judges dependent on its will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries⁽⁸⁾.

70 The bar has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.⁽⁹⁾

71 He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies of prosecutors paid by extorted fees without the Consent of our legislatures.

72 Defendants have combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving their assent to their acts of pretended legislation and rule making for the following illegal and antagonistic purposes:

For attempting to protect themselves by mock legislative grants of immunity;

For cutting off our trade with all parts of the legal world by refusing to assent to reciprocity;

For imposing Taxes on us without our a Consent⁽¹⁰⁾;

For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury⁽¹¹⁾;

For transporting us beyond our county seat to be tried for pretended offenses⁽¹²⁾;

For ignoring, violating, ridiculing, and causing disrespect for the provisions of the California constitution, the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the Magna Carta - our most valuable charters and laws and for altering fundamentally our republican form of government by conspiring to grab power and abuse our system of checks and balances;

For portending to form the state bar court in violation of the constitution and by attempting to suspend bar membership in violation of the California constitutional guarantee that all admitted lawyers "are and shall be" bar members;

For suspending normal jurisdiction of the courts over administrative tribunals, by intruding into our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate in lawyer discipline in all cases whatsoever - and then hearing no cases - but instead rubber-stamping the actions of its unlawfully appointed appointees in its unconstitutional state bar court.

The bar and Lucas court have abdicated constitutional government here by declaring us out of its protection and waging war against us.

He has constrained our fellow attorneys be taken captive on bogus charges⁽¹³⁾.

He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, by constant lawyer-bashing.

Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury; those who protest most vocally are prosecuted most vigorously.

The bar is now disproportionately staffed by asian and black women. It is staffed and controlled by persons who have spent their entire life on the government dole - of whom Diane Yu is the paradigm. Our bar is now overrun by communist socialist government lawyers who haven't a clue about free market economics. The bar/Lucas court axis has displayed nearly every symptom that may define a tyrant, and is unfit to sit in judgment over private lawyers. Communist government workers cannot fairly sit in judgment of sole practitioners. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their manipulation of our legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

We, aggrieved sole practitioners, therefore appeal to the federal courts for rectitude and by authority of 42 USC 1983 solemnly publish and declare, that lawyers are, and of Right ought to be free and independent; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the state bar, and that all political connection between them and state bar, is and ought to be totally dissolved. We affirm our right under the California constitution to sue the state bar, to conclude peace, to freely contract for legal services, to establish commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which independent lawyers may of right do.

We demand the following of the California state bar:

73 No more predatory financing of discipline. It is unnatural to pay an organization whose sole function is to punish us; bar dues shall be voluntary - as shall be membership; bar discipline shall be paid for by those who desire the prosecution.

74 No suspension of practice of sole practitioners. Sole practitioners often cannot continue to pay rent, phone, secretaries, advertising, etc. during a suspension of even 30 days. Suspension for sole practitioners constitutes forfeiture and taking of plaintiff's livelihood - and therefore shall be prohibited.

75 No repetition of ethics exams. No more punishment by taking an ethics exam - unless the lawyer has not already passed an ethics exam. Most attorneys were required to pass the professional responsibility exam already - and they shall not be required to pass it again.

76 Adequate notice of offenses. The ethics codes shall be revised. All offenses shall be specifically defined. "Violation of attorney oath", "offensive personality" and such other amorphous clauses shall no longer be a basis for prosecution.

77 One form of punishment. Only jail and fines shall be punishment. No more seminars, MCLE or otherwise.

78 Paralegal punishment parity. The bar shall prosecute all non-attorneys such as paralegals who commit ethics offenses - or who fill out legal forms - if the bar prosecutes suspended attorneys for such conduct.

79 Probation without punishment. No burdensome punishment (such as repetition of ethics exam and filing of reports) as terms of probation - just probation.

80 6007 (mental incapacity) revision. The bar shall cease abuse of 6007. No 6007 OSC except on probable cause.

81 No interim suspension. No interim suspension except upon showing of irreparable harm and the other requisites of an injunction. If it is important enough to stop his practice then it is important enough to take time for a hearing.

82 No costs of discipline. No costs of investigation, prosecution, or other imposed upon attorney.

83 No double jeopardy. No double jeopardy prosecution for crimes under the guise of moral turpitude hearings or whatever.

84 Restitution from bar for interest. Give trust fund interest back to clients or their attorneys.

85 Trust fund rule revision. Revision and removal of petty trust fund rules.

86 Escrow agencies. Establish escrow agencies to distribute funds for attorneys with cash problems - rather than tempting them beyond their financial means.

87 Judgment by peers. Lawyers shall be adjudged by a volunteer panel of at least 3 of their peers. Plaintiff PI/ criminal defense sole practitioners shall not be judged by government lawyers or other lawyers who are paid a salary.

88 Ease of service of process. Revision of rules of state bar court (and recommendation to change in other rules) so that in pro per lawyers can sign their own proofs of service.

89 Term limits. Diane Yu who has spent her entire career at the bar must go.

90 Term limits. Directorship and employment by the bar either directly or by contract shall be limited to 4 years.

PRAYER

Wherefore plaintiff requests the following relief. Plaintiffs primary concern is injunctive relief.

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

91 $30 million. Plaintiff's reputation as a successful litigator in police misconduct cases gave in an opportunity to cash in on high value cases. The bar took away that unique window of opportunity.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

92 $112.5 million from the state bar - equivalent to 18 months of the bar's income - which is appropriate punishment for unjustly denying to plaintiff his own income for 6 months - the factor of 3 being traditionally used for punishment.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

93 For the 8th cause of action regarding abuses of due process rights by Jennifer Gee we ask this district court to enjoin any suspension or disbarment of plaintiff by defendants pending appeal and until remedial measures are taken to prevent rectify and halt violation of plaintiff's rights.

94 Order and supervise revision of discipline system.

95 Monitor and correct racial and gender bias in discipline and staffing.

96 Monitor discipline by classification as sole practitioner, plaintiff P.I. counsel, and criminal defense counsel.

97 Order a return of trust funds to the attorney and client.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

98 Plaintiff request that this court find that plaintiff's federal right of due process is violated when a state removes 2 levels of traditional appeal from administrative rulings leaving appeal only to the state supreme court which supreme court appointed the pseudo judges whose judgment is challenged on appeal.

99 Plaintiff asks this court to declare that all state bar employee pseudo judges have implicit bias in hearing cases regarding client trust funds by virtue of the state bars receipt of interest on the funds.

100 Plaintiff asks this court to declare the taking of trust fund interest by the bar to be a taking in violation of the 5th amendment - and unconstitutional.

ATTORNEY FEES

101 Plaintiff requests award of attorney fees under all theories applicable.

102 The unconstitutionality of the California State Bar Act and Court, the involved rules and processes of the California attorney licensing system, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the overriding issue of the absence of a competent state court to hear and determine constitutional issues concerning the State Bar Association are issues deserving of the consideration and determination of a constitutional court of law in the Federal Court system.

Because these issues are fundamental, repeating, and causing irreparable harm they should receive high priority. If lawyers, the people responsible for order in society, cannot obtain justice for themselves, then we have a problem. Plaintiff's career is at stake - not because he damaged anybody - but because he has been held to an unfair standard and judged by an unfair tribunal. His fundamental rights are being trampled upon - his right to work, his reputation, and his property.

103 We demand a jury.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________ Wednesday 21 December 94.

Douglas Palaschak, Counsel for Frank Adams

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES

SUMMARY

0.1 There is no state bar court in California. The state bar pseudo court is unconstitutional. The California constitution quite specifically enumerates the courts - and this state bar pseudo court is not one of them. The California Supreme Court is not authorized to create any courts whatsoever. The legislature may merely designate districts for municipal, appellate, and justice courts - but not a state bar court. This prosecution by the state bar pseudo court is a violation of Adams's right under color of state law.

SUMMARY OF ADAMS'S TOP 10 AUTHORITIES

#1 case: Ross. 1983. Nevada Supreme Court. State bar declared unconstitutional.

#2 case: Gentile v State Bar of Nev. 1991. U.S. Supreme Court. Prosecution must be dismissed because non-ABA provisions are facially vague.

#3 case: Marbury v Madison 1803. U.S. Supreme Court refused to issue writ of mandamus although they ostensibly had jurisdiction under federal statute; the statute gave jurisdiction contrary to the U.S. Constitution and the constitution must prevail over statute. Similarly the creation and delegation of duties to the state bar pseudo court violates the California constitution.

#4 case: Tumey. 1927. U.S. Supreme Court. Mayor cannot be judge where fines pay court expenses.

#5 case: Aetna. 1986. U.S. Supreme Court. Sets standard for bias of justices of state supreme court.

#6 case: Gibson. 1973. U.S. Supreme Court. Pervasive bias precludes abstention.

#7 case: Goldberg v Kelly. 1970. U.S. Supreme Court. General Due Process.

#8 case: Bell v Burson. 1972. U.S.Supreme Court. Due process in license suspension.

#9 case: Keller. 1990. U.S. Supreme Court.

#10 case: Flangas. 1981. 9th Circuit. Pervasive bias precludes Younger abstention.

Procedural Status and Prologue

0.2 Plaintiff is in the middle of a discipline hearing in state bar court. Several substantial procedural deprivations of his due process rights have happened. Ordinarily one would utilize the state courts to vindicate these constitutional rights. However, state bar administrative hearings are not appealable de novo to superior court as is the practice with most state administrative hearings. Furthermore, the California supreme court has eliminated (unconstitutionally, we contend) the state court of appeal as an avenue of appeal. Only the California supreme court remains (after challenging the result in the state bar court's review department) - but the California supreme court is the very body who appointed the pseudo judges of the new (1989) state bar court. Thus there would be bias were the court to sit in judgment of their appointees.

Incidental Issue #0.3 Judge Steven Wilson, the federal district court judge who heard the Hirsh, Server, and Perry cases should have recused himself because of the money he earns from the state bar - a party to those cases. See 54 ALR Fed 855 Disqualification of judge under 28 USC section 455(b)(5)(iii) where judge or his or her spouse, or certain of their relatives, is known to have an interest that could be affected by the proceeding.

U. S. District Court Judge Steven Wilson is a member of the State Bar Association and earns money from forced paid attendance at bar "educational" propaganda functions. Judge Wilson failed to comply with the spirit of the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Liljeberg v Health Services Acquisition Corp. 486 US 847, 108 S Ct 2194, 100 L Ed 2d 855 (1988) and 28 USC 455(b)(5)(iii) requiring federal judges to remove themselves from cases in which an entity with whom they are associated financially benefits⁽¹⁴⁾. The 3 pending federal cases brought by California state bar members are Hirsh v Justices, docket no. 93-4114 SVW(Bx), Server v Justices, docket no. 93-6789 SVW(Bx), and Perry v Justices, docket no. 93-6909 SVW (Bx), Central District of the District of California.

Issue #1 - the main issue: Corollary to Marbury v Madison. There is no state bar court in California; this is a non-court. An unconstitutional act is void ab initio.

Argument #1.1: The creation of the state bar pseudo court was an unconstitutional act and therefore void from the beginning - and very similar to the Judiciary Act of 1789 which also portended to give jurisdiction contrary to a constitution.

Authority: The California constitution defines, empower, and enumerates the courts of the California. They are supreme, appellate, superior, municipal, and justice - but not a state bar court. This 5 year charade is merely an out-of-control bureaucracy fueled by compelled dues paid out of fear by a wealthy compelled membership. Our U.S. Supreme Court 191 years ago dealt with the issue of validity of legislation that contravenes the constitution in Marbury v Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L Ed 60. They held, of course, that a void act is void ab initio! In Norton v Shelby County the U.S. Supreme Court nullified the issuance of municipal bonds due to lack of constitutional authority of the issuing agency. Said the court:

"There can be no officer if there be no office to fill . . . An unconstitutional act is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it has never passed." - U.S. Supreme Court in Norton v Shelby County (1886) 30 L Ed 178.

This is just another way of saying that an unconstitutional legislative act is void ab initio - extremely logical. Nonetheless the concept gave pause to the 4th Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1803⁽¹⁵⁾. Chief Justice Marshall seems to have overlooked the recusal issue; he had personal knowledge of the facts of the case. Marshall was nominated by a lame duck Federalist incumbent and then asked to issue a writ of mandamus to execute other even later midnight judicial appointees. The Republicans objected to the midnight appointees. The law was clear that the appointments were valid. Nonetheless, Marshall abstained because the U.S. Supreme Court did not have original jurisdiction to issue mandates in this case. The constitution delimited the jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. To complicate matters, the Judiciary Act portended to give the Supreme Court the authority to issue the writ - but the Judiciary Act contradicted the constitution. Marshall ruled that the Judiciary Act was unconstitutional and therefore the Supreme Court had no authority to issue a writ of mandamus. Similarly, the California constitution delimits the types of court in California - and the powers of the legislature and of the courts. The California constitution does not create a "state bar court" and does not give the legislature or the California Supreme Court the right to create a "state bar court". Therefore the creation of the state bar pseudo court was an unconstitutional act which was void ab initio. Just as an early Congress passed the illegal Judiciary Act of 1789, so the Lucas court and its co-conspirators attempted to authorize power where they lacked authority to do so - but they muddied the waters so that the mechanism is not so easily described - as seen in the next paragraph.

How the Lucas court and its Judicial Council rules violate the California constitution.

An attempt to find authority for creation of the state bar pseudo court is a study in hiding the ball. Rule 951 of California Rules of court (which is presumably dictated by the California Supreme Court or its agent, the California Judicial Council, an organ created by the California constitution, article 6, section 6). The kernel of article 6, section 6 is:

"To improve the administration of justice the council shall survey judicia business an make recommendations to the courts, make rules or court administration practice and procedure not inconsistent with statute and perform other functions prescribed by statute." -California constitution, article 6, section 6.

The California constitution specifies the Supreme Court (article 6, section 2), directs the legislature to create districts for appellate courts (article 6, section 3), creates a superior court in each county (article 6, section 4), and gives the legislature the authority to create municipal and justice court (article 6, section 5). Nowhere in the California constitution is court-creation-power given to the Supreme Court, legislature, or state bar.

Division II of the state bar rules deal with the state bar court.

Rule 100 is the first rule and stated in 1982:

"The state bar court consists of members of the state bar and non-lawyers appointed by the board of governors, and 2 non-lawyers appointed by the governor. ..."

Then, amended August 26 (by the state bar? by the judicial council?) and effective just 5 days later, rule 100 now says:

"State bar court is the court created pursuant to section 6086.5 of the B&P code, consisting of judges and judges pro tempore."

Total. That is it⁽¹⁶⁾.

Summary: The convoluted route of state bar pseudo court illegitimate empowerment.

To review, the state bar pseudo court was created by rule 100 of the state bar but the rule portends to derive its authority from B&P 6086.5, in other words, from the legislature - the legislature has no authority to create a court!

Incidental Historical Note #1.2 First official use of the term "state bar court".

Although 6086.5 has been around since 1965 the phrase "state bar court" did not (disciplinary boards was the term subbed out in the amendment) appear until 1985 amendment effective 86. This was when hysteria was created about bar discipline and the bar went out of control. However, consistent with its pattern treachery and deception, the bar attempted to revise history by substituting the phrase "state bar court" for "disciplinary boards" in older statutes to make it appear that the state bar pseudo court was well established already.

In 1988 the legislature created the review department by new statute 6086.65.

Argument #1.3 Research into other state constitutions supports Adams's position.

California, like Illinois, has deleted authority in government to create new courts. It has deleted the clause permitting the State legislature to create new courts. Article 6, section 1, California constitution. In line with the precept that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," when the voters deleted the clause permitting the government to create new courts, they excluded that power in government and reserved it to themselves. Since 1966, a new court may be created only by constitutional amendment voted and passed by the Respondent, registered voter, and other registered voters. They have not voted to have a state bar court in California.

Argument #1.4 California case law strongly holds that no one in government is permitted to create a court or grant judicial power to anyone.

Authority: Lentz v McMahon 231 Cal Rptr 622 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1986); Jacobs v Board of Dental Examiners 75 P2d 96, 24 C.A. 2d 359 (1938); Katz v Workers Compensation Board 78 Cal Rptr 815, 636 P2d 1153, 30 C. 3d 353 (1981); Laisne v State Board of Optometry 123 P2d 457, 19 C. 2d 831 (1942); Lorber v Storrow 70 P2d 513, 22 C.A.2d 25 (1937); McCracken v Board of Medical Examiners 74 P2d 289, 24 C.A. 2d 58 (1938) ; Pacific Coast Casualty v Pillsbury 171 C. 319, 153 P 24; Perry Farms Inc. v Agr. Labor Relations Board 86 Cal App. 3d 460, 150 Cal Rptr 495; Western Metal Supply Co. v Pillsbury 171 Cal 407, 156 P 491.

Argument #1.5 California constitution article 6, section 9 defines the state bar as a public corporation and does not vest in it the right to create courts.

Argument #1.6 The California bar is a public corporation - not a court - and is not authorized to create a court.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Keller v State Bar of California __US__, 110 S Ct 2228, 110 L Ed 2d 1 (1990) that the California state bar is not a part of the government because it is not sanctioned by voters. It may act only as professional advisers to those who are the lawfully elected and chosen government of a State. Since the State Bar may not be part of the government of a State, the state bar pseudo court is a null and void entity, retroactive to its inception.

Incidental Issue:Immunity.

In 1988, B&P 6079.1 was passed, portending to grant immunity to pseudo judges.

"6079.1 Presiding judge and hearing judges of state bar court; pro tempore judges,; immunity.

(a) The supreme court shall appoint a presiding judge of the state bar court an no fewer than six hearing judges, an such additional hearing judges as may be authorized by the legislature to efficiently decide any and all regulatory matters pending before the hearing department of the state bar court The presiding judge and all other judges of that department shall be appointed for a term of 6 years and may be reappointed for additional 6 year terms. Any judge appointed under this section shall be subject to admonition, censure, removal, or retirement by the supreme court upon the same grounds as provided for judges of court of record of this state....

Argument #1.7 Unconstitutional delegation. The Supreme Court has unlawfully delegated its disciplinary authority to the state bar pseudo court by 1) refusing to hear attorney discipline cases and 2)by rubber-stamping state bar pseudo court decisions merely to avoid the appearance of delegation.

Argument #1.8 Creation and financing of a court is ULTRA VIRES - not authorized by the corporate charter of the state bar.

Argument #1.9 Judges can only be appointed by the governor or elected; therefore pseudo judges appointed to the pseudo court of the state bar cannot possibly be judges - nor administrative law judges.

The constitutional power to appoint judges belongs to the Governor.

"Whenever a state or local government by popular election selects persons to perform public functions, the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter have an equal opportunity to participate..." Hadley, supra, p. 52. "... A qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote in elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted. Ex Parte Siebold 100 US 371 (1880), Ex Parte Yarborough 110 US 651 (1884), United States v Mosely 238 US 383 (1915), Guinn v United States 238 US 347 (1915), Lane v Wilson 307 US 268 (1939), United States v Classic 313 US 299 (1941)." Hadley, supra., p. 52.

Issue #1.10 Business and Professions Code section 6086.5 authorizing the twenty three member board of the State Bar to create a State Bar Court is patently unconstitutional.

B&P 6086.5 unconstitutionally portends to delegate to a few private people in a private bar association the public power of the people to create their own courts. See Eubank v Richmond 226 US 137,143; Carter v Carter v Helfling 298 US 239 (1936), Suss, and Independence Public Media.

The State Bar Act statutes also unlawfully delegates to the same group of private persons judicial power to license the state's lawyers. Being a public function, it is non-delegable to private people. Sections 6007, 6084, 6086.5; Amendments five and fourteen, US Constitution; Southern Railway Co. v Virginia (1933) 290 US 190. See Carter, Eubank, Suss, and Independence Public Media.

There are nine appointees of the California Supreme Court sitting on the prosecuting party's pseudo court as pseudo judges. All appointees were and are selected from a list exclusively provided by the prosecuting party. Sections 6079.5, 6079.1(c), 6086.65 (a), Ca. Rules of Court, Rule 961. Their nine appointees were and are selected exclusively from a list pre-screened and recommended by the financial arm of the prosecuting party. Sections 6030, 6079.1(c), 6086.65(a). Their nine appointees require a minimum of one million dollars a year to pay their base salaries as employees of the prosecuting party. Sections 6079.1(d), 6086.65 (a). There are no merit requirements for said appointees. Section 6086.65 (a), 6069.1(b). The appointee judges are hired, paid, trained, housed, and employed as employees of the prosecuting party. Section 6079.5, 6079.1(c)(d), 6086.5, 6086.65(a). The California Supreme Court has assumed the fiduciary role of overseeing the competence and ethics of their appointees to the prosecuting party, reserving to itself the right to take action for their removal. California Rules of Court, Rule 961 (b).

Section 1.11 Specific dollar amounts of financial interest.

Upon adjudications of guilt, the hearing and review department pseudo judges of the pseudo court impose three types of money awards for their private employer and themselves. Ca. Business and Professions Code sections 6086.10(a)(b)(c), 6086.13. Those three tiers of financial interest are 1) administrative costs, 2) monetary sanctions, and 3) "tying" conditions. Sections 6086.10(a)(b) 6086.13, 6002. The California State Bar Association alleges unpaid administrative costs for the first three quarters of 1993 are .7 percent of its budget, or $328,242. Hirsh CR:41:2:1-13. Since the paid administrative costs are double the amount of the unpaid administrative costs, since over two thirds of the adjudged guilty lawyers pay the administrative costs immediately, since their suspensions may not cease until the sums are paid off, the State Bar assesses approximately one million dollars a year for the first tier of its financial interest, administrative costs, in finding accused lawyers guilty. That sum pays the salaries of the California Supreme Court's appointees. Section 6079.1(d). The California Supreme Court has a one hundred percent financial interest for their appointees in finding accused lawyers guilty, since the first tier of its money awards against each accused, exclusive of the second and third tiers it imposes, pays the one million dollars required for the salaries of its appointees. Sections 6079.1(a), 6086.65(a)(d), 6086.10(b), 6084., California Rules of Court, Rules 951-964.

In regard to the first tier of financial interest, the financial arm of the prosecuting party has set up levels of administrative costs to reimburse itself for the salaries, benefits, and perks of its investigators, prosecutors, judges, and staff, and to provide funds for its other activities, in addition to recoupment of its taxable costs and other out-of-pocket expenses. Section 6086.10(a)(b). The thousands of dollars in assessments for these administrative costs increase as an accused refuses to agree to his guilt and to voluntarily agree to pay off the prosecuting party. Thus, Level I assessments are for those who voluntarily agree to guilt and to deliver the cash to the prosecuting party prior to the commencement of formal hearings. Level II assessments are approximately $3,000 more at a minimum, since a hearing is required, which requires the salaries of the prosecuting party's investigators, prosecutors, and judges' time, and their salaries must be recouped from the accused. Level III is approximately $6,000 more at a minimum, for those who refuse to admit to guilt after hearing and proceed to appeal to the State Supreme Court which has automatically denied the petition of each and every accused lawyer. The salaries and benefits for the prosecuting party's investigators, prosecutors, judges, and staff must be recouped from the accused whose recalcitrance in refusing to agree to guilt and voluntary "buy out" must be punished by an assessment of $6,000 more. For each additional hearing, administrative costs are assessed to cover the investigator, prosecutor, judges, and staff' salaries and benefits. Section 6086.10(b). Unlike "fines," the administrative costs are not based on gravity of offense, are not provided by statute, are not fixed, and are not paid into the Public treasury. They are based on the time and salaries of the employee prosecutor, investigator, judges, and staff, and are paid to a private prosecuting party to reimburse the salaries and benefits of its employee investigators, prosecutors, judges, and staff and to provide funds for its other programs. Section 6086.10(b).

Issue #2 Bias. Pervasive bias. Bias of this magnitude precludes due process and it precludes federal abstention.

Summary: Federal abstention was only ordered in Flangas v State Bar of Nevada 655 F2d 946 because the recusal remedy existed in the Nevada state court - but California supreme court justices are not required to recuse themselves.

Argument #2.1 The Absence of state recusal remedy compels federal court intervention.

California, unlike Nevada and Hawaii, has no recusal remedies for its State Supreme Court Justices. The significance of a state recusal remedy is discussed in Flangas v State Bar of Nevada 655 F2d 946:

"The district judge reasoned that although he would normally dismiss the motion for preliminary injunction on the basis of abstention, as he had originally done, he was required to grant the injunction based upon the fact that the Nevada Supreme Court was still biased-in-fact, despite the recusal of the two justices. The district judge concluded that the bias-in-fact on the Nevada Supreme Court constituted an "exceptional circumstance" that is an exception to the general rule against enjoining ongoing state proceedings. See Rosenthal v Carr 614 F2d 1219 (9th circuit 1980). The district court derived this particular exception from Gibson v Berryhill in which the [U.S. Supreme] court held that when a state administrative body is incompetent to adjudicate a matter by virtue of pervasive bias, a district court need not abstain from issuing appropriate judicial relief.

...If Flangas attempts to utilize the statutory and constitutional measures available under Nevada law to cure the alleged bias of the Nevada Supreme Court and those attempts are unsuccessful because of the inadequacy in the Nevada procedures, it will then be appropriate for the federal courts to determine whether this case fits within the Gibson exception to Younger [abstention]." - 9th circuit in Flangas v State Bar of Nevada (1981) 655 F2d 946 overruling the order by District Judge Harry Clairborne granting an injunction against the state bar. See also Partington v Gedan 880 F2d 116 (Ninth Cir. 1989).

By comparison California has no state statute or rule permitting disqualification of a state supreme court justice - and therefore Younger abstention does not apply. See California Rules of Court, Rules 1-100, CCP sections 170 et seq. The California constitution has no provision for removal of a State supreme court justice, unless he is under indictment or an information or is recommended for removal or retirement from office by the California Commission on Judicial Performance. Article 6, section 18, Ca. Constitution. While the State Constitution provides that the California Supreme Court may transfer a case to a Court of Appeals or assign Court of Appeals Justices to sit in the California Supreme Court, this is discretionary with the California Supreme Court. Article 6, section 12(a), Ca. Constitution. See Mosk v Superior Court of Los Angeles County 159 Cal Rptr 494, 601 P 3d 1030, 25 C3d 474 (1979). The California Rules of Court do not incorporate the California Judicial Code of Conduct specifying grounds for and requirements for disqualification of a judge, and the California Supreme Court Rules have no provision for disqualification of the members of the California Supreme Court from cases. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 1-100. The California and American Bar Association Judicial Codes of Conduct which prohibit judges sitting on cases for "financial interest" when they are "active participants in the affairs of a party," is not codified in the California Rules of Court, and the California state appellate justice recusal standard of Kaufman exempts state appellate justices from the state's judicial disqualification law.

Since the bias is personal and extrajudicial, and state law has no constitutional or state recusal remedies for its State Supreme Court Justices, state law prevents presentation of the issues concerning bias within any member of the California Supreme Court.

The American Bar Association has voted to disapprove the California attorney licensing system for a reason that applies equally well to the California attorney discipline system - bias. Refer the ABA Commission on Disciplinary Enforcement, and vote of House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, February 6, 1992.

The state bar pseudo court hearing the charges is created, financed, owned, run, controlled, and staffed by the financial arm of the prosecuting party. Sections 6030, 6086.5, 6086.65, 6079.1, 6079.5. The prosecuting party is, by name, a private trade association. Section 6000 et. seq, 6079.5. Its compelled attorney members are not permitted to participate in discipline. Sections 6002, 6086.65, 6079.1, 6079.5, Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 951-964. Only employees of the prosecuting party may participate. Sections 6086.65, 6086.5, 6079.1, 6079.5. Its financial and executive arm is its Board of Governors. Section 6030.

Argument #2.2 The exhaustion of state remedies requirement is inapplicable to any suit under 42 USC 1983.

"In my opinion, the inapplicability of the exhaustion requirement to any suit brought under §1983 has been firmly settled by this Court's prior decisions, McNeese v Board of Education 393 US 668 @671, 10 L Ed 2d 62, 83 S Ct 1433 (1963). See also Houghton v Shafer, 392 US 639, 20 L Ed 2d 1319, 88 S Ct 2119 (1968); King v Smith 392 US 309 @312 note 4, 20 L Ed 2d 1118, 88 S Ct 2128 (1968); Damico v California 389 US 416, 19 L Ed 2d 647, 88 S Ct 526 (1967)." -Concurring opinions of Justice Brennan in Gibson v Berryhill 36 L Ed 2d @501.

Issue #2.3 All state bar court pseudo judges have a fatal financial bias - similar to the financial bias of federal judge Wilson - and would be obliged to recuse themselves if they were judges.

Since assuming the role of appointing authority for the financial arm to the prosecuting party in 1989, the California Supreme Court has not disclosed its partisan role for the prosecuting party. It has not disclosed it in the over 2,000 discipline cases it has decided. All accused lawyers have been found guilty. All petitions have been denied. Since 1991, the California Supreme Court has ordered monies paid to its' appointees' employer without disclosure in the 2,000 cases. Each accused was ordered suspended or disbarred. The California Supreme Court has ordered the three tiers of financial interest paid for the benefit of their appointees and their employer from each accused. They have concealed how much money they are ordering paid to and for their appointees and to and for their appointees' employer. The money awards requested and ordered to be paid are sent privately to the State Bar by the California Supreme Court from its Court file, so that the public records are altered and destroyed by the California Supreme Court to conceal the amount of cash the California Supreme Court is giving its appointees and their employer in the over 2,000 cases.

The State Bar Court, being a private entity, refuses to include the information in its files, claiming it is not a court, but a private trade association whose financial affairs are private and confidential.

The California Supreme Court has issued over 2,000 decisions without disclosure the monies they are awarding by disbarring or suspending the accused is for their appointees and their appointees' private employer. Since 1991, all disbarments and suspensions by the California Supreme Court are by private minute order. There are no decisions. All disbarments and suspensions issue per curiam. There is no disclosure of issues, law, facts, or the California Supreme Court's role for the prosecuting party.

The California Supreme Court passed Rules of Court in 1990 superseding the state statute permitting access to a State Court of Appeal to hear and determine State Bar matters and ordered accused lawyers to file with it. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 951-964, Section 6082. Said rules were passed, similar to the appointments, based on the exclusive recommendation and proposal of the financial arm of the prosecuting party. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 951-964. No disclosure was made on passage of these Rules of Court of the California Supreme Court's partisan role for the prosecuting party and its financial arm in appointing employees of it. Review is discretionary. These Rules of Court do not permit review of constitutional issues, or of the disqualification to sit of the California Supreme Court since January 1, 1989 on State Bar cases or to license the State's attorneys. Ca. Rules of Court, Rule 954. The unconstitutionality of state bar pseudo court for violating the rights of the accused, as a registered voter, to vote to create his own courts, elect and remove his own judges to his own courts, and to have his vote ordering the State Bar to be a corporation may not be raised or determined in the disciplinary proceedings. These issues are not grounds for review. Ca. Rules of Court, Rule 954. Since all petitions have been summarily denied by private minute order since 1991, state law prevents presentation of all issues of all accused lawyers. These Rules of Court, pursuant to the California Supreme Court's "Finality Rule," and its decision-making, grant judicial power to its appointees and their co-employees to disbar and suspend lawyers directly. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 951-964, Conway v State Bar 47 C3d 1107, 255 Cal Rptr 390 (1989). State law prohibits presentation of the unconstitutionality of the State Bar Court. It does not provide for access to a competent court of law to hear and determine the issues. The state bar pseudo court is constitutionally prohibited from declaring the pseudo courts enabling statutes unconstitutional. Article 3, section 3.5, Ca. Constitution. Due to the duality of role of the California Supreme Court - one private and partisan for the prosecuting party which created and owns the State Bar Court and one adjudicative - it is "unconstitutionally constituted" to hear and determine issues concerning the California State Bar Association and its State Bar Court. Gibson v Berryhill 411 US 564, 578-79, 93 S Ct 1689, 1697-98, 36 L Ed 2d 488 (1973). Since the California Supreme Court has, by its rule-making, barred access to other courts, it has barred presentation of the unconstitutionality of the State Bar Court. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 951-964.

State law prohibits presentation of the bias issues. The State Bar Court may not declare the statutes permitting the California Supreme Court to sit on State Bar cases or to license the State's lawyers unconstitutional due to its bias. Article 3, section 3.5, California constitution. The California Supreme Court prohibits presentation of the bias issues. It has ruled that state disqualification law does not apply to it. Kaufman v Court of Appeals 31 C3d 933, 939-940 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court ordered state supreme court justices to comply with disqualification law.⁽¹⁷⁾ Nonetheless the California Supreme Court has since 1986 refused to comply with the standards enunciated by United States Supreme Court in Aetna Life Insurance Company v La Voie (1986) 475 US 813, 89 L Ed 2d 823, 106 S Ct 1580, Lebbos v State Bar (1991) 53 C3d 37, 278 Cal Rptr 845, 806 P2d 317, at 41, ft.1. State law states disqualification law and remedies does not apply to state appellate court Justices. Kaufman v Court of Appeal (1982) 31 C3d 933, 184 Cal Rptr 302, 647 P2d 1081 (1982). This decision states each state appellate justice determines his own bias, and the only issue on appeal is whether the proceedings, by reason of bias, became prejudicially unfair. Since there is no state court appeal from a decision of the State Supreme Court, this formulation does not address the issue when the alleged bias is in one or more members of the California Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court in Aetna ruled that state supreme court justices must remove themselves from cases when they have an interest in the outcome based on an objective person test, and that such interest in the outcome is per se prejudicially unfair. There is no state statute or rule permitting disqualification of a State Supreme Court Justice. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 1-100, C.C.P. section 170 et seq regarding disqualification of judges. The California Constitution has no provision for removal of a State Supreme Court Justice, unless he is under indictment or an information or is recommended for removal or retirement from office by the California Commission on Judicial Performance. Article 6, section 18, Ca. Constitution. While the State Constitution provides the California Supreme Court may transfer a case to a Court of Appeals or assign Court of Appeals Justices to sit in the California Supreme Court, this is discretionary with the California Supreme Court. Article 6, section 12(a), Ca. Constitution. See Mosk v Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 159 Cal Rptr 494, 601 P3d 1030, 25 C3d 474. The California Rules of Court do not incorporate the California Judicial Code of Conduct specifying grounds for and requirements for disqualification of a judge, and the California Supreme Court Rules have no provision for disqualification of the members of the California Supreme Court from cases. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 1-100. Since the bias is personal and extrajudicial, and state law has no constitutional or state recusal remedies for its State Supreme Court Justices, state law prohibits presentation of the issues concerning bias within any member of the California Supreme Court.

The California Supreme Court has passed Rules of Professional Conduct, since assuming its role for the prosecuting party. Ca. Rules of Professional Conduct, May, 1989. Those Rules of Professional Conduct were proposed by the prosecuting party. They were adopted by the California Supreme Court without disclosure of its private and partisan role for the prosecuting party proposing the rules. Those Rules are rejected by the American Bar Association. Compare ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent tenders the lack of access to a competent court of law for accused lawyers has denied to over 2,000 attorneys fundamental due process of law and their first and fourteenth amendment rights to petition for redress of grievances since January 1, 1989, the State Bar Court is a void and unconstitutional entity retroactive to January 1, 1983, and all acts done in its name are void retroactive to January 1, 1983. As an unconstitutional court, it has never had any existence and may never have any existence. Norton v Shelby County 118 US 425, 30 L Ed 2d 178, 6 S Ct 1121.

By reason of Article 3, section 3.5 of the California Constitution, the state bar pseudo court is not empowered to declare the State Bar Act and the pseudo court unconstitutional. The absence of any competent state court to hear the issues properly compels a stay until the Federal Court rules on the constitutionality of the state bar act and the legitimacy of the state bar's pseudo court and the absence of a constitutional state court system to license the Respondent as an attorney at law within the State of California. Since the state bar pseudo court is prohibited by the California Supreme Court from declare statutes unconstitutional, it should dismiss the proceedings for patent unconstitutionality or stay its proceedings until the Federal Court rules.

Issue #3 State bar pseudo-prosecutors have a financial stake in the outcome because 1) their salary comes from the booty; and 2) they may (or may not) receive bonuses for convictions.

In U.S. v Good Real Property (Dec 1993) __US__, __L Ed 2d__, 114 S Ct 492 the U.S. Supreme Court held a forfeiture proceeding unconstitutional saying that the adversary hearing is even more important where the prosecuting bureaucracy is permitted to gorge itself w